Monetary theory in the laboratory by John Duffy
1 For a recent survey, see, for
example, Kagel and Roth
(1995).









uring the past few decades, an
increasing number of economists 
have begun conducting controlled
laboratory experiments with paid human
subjects in an effort to test theories of eco-
nomic behavior.  Economists have turned
to laboratory experiments because in many
instances they lack the appropriate nonex-
perimental ﬁeld data that are required to
test their theories. Economic experiments
usually involve groups of subjects,
typically college students, who play simple
economic decision-making games and are
paid on the basis of the decisions they
make. The games subjects play and the
monetary rewards they can earn in the
experiment are constructed in a manner
that approximates the theoretical environ-
ment being studied so that the data
collected from the experiment can be used
to prove or disprove the theory.
To date, the experimental methodology
has been used primarily by microeconomists
and game theorists to test theories of indi-
vidual or strategic behavior in various
economic environments.1 Using laboratory
experiments, researchers have made substan-
tial inroads in these ﬁelds; microeconomists
and game theorists now readily acknowledge
the relevance of using experiments to test
theory and have begun to develop new theo-
ries to explain experimental ﬁndings that
are at odds with existing theories.
By contrast, there has been relatively
little use of the experimental methodology
in macroeconomics. A likely explanation is
that the scale of macroeconomic phenomena
is perceived to be too great to be tested in
controlled laboratory experiments with small
groups of subjects. That would almost cer-
tainly be the view, for example, among
applied macroeconomists working with
ﬁeld data. Today, however, most macroeco-
nomic theorists work with models that
build on explicit microfoundations for the
behavior of individuals. These models often
impose artiﬁcial restrictions on individuals’
behavior that are not embodied in any avail-
able ﬁeld data.  Consequently, it often is not
possible to empirically test the aggregate
predictions that emerge from these models.
Even in those cases where the aggregate
predictions of microfoundation models can
be tested using ﬁeld data, it is not always
possible to use ﬁeld data to verify whether
behavior at the individual level adheres to
the predictions or assumptions of these models.
On the other hand, controlled labora-
tory experiments can be used to test both
the aggregate and individual predictions of
microfoundation models. Though econo-
mists need to be wary of generalizing from
the results of laboratory experiments that
involve small groups of subjects to aggre-
gate macroeconomic activity, there should
be somewhat less objection to using exper-
iments to test the predictions of individual
behavior in macroeconomic models with
explicit microfoundations. Because the
predictions of these macroeconomic
models stand on their assumptions of how
individuals behave, laboratory evidence
can test the reasonableness of a particular
model as a characterization of some
macroeconomic activity.  And in the
increasing number of macroeconomic
models that admit multiple equilibria, 
laboratory evidence can be used to guide
researchers toward those equilibria that
subjects perceive as more relevant. Finally,
macroeconomists can use laboratory
methods to conduct policy experiments
that would be impossible to conduct out-
side of the laboratory.
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2 Some of this literature is also
discussed in surveys by
Marimon (1997), Ochs
(1995), and Sargent (1993).
3 While there have been many
experiments involving tests of
backward induction, (see, for
example, Smith, Suchanek,
and Williams [1988] and
McKelvey and Palfrey [1992]),
McCabe’s (1989) is the only
one to consider whether sub-
jects apply backward induction
in assessing the value of money.
4 Wallace (1998) proposes that
money should not be a primi-
tive in theories of money.  In
experimental tests of monetary
theories there is a similar dic-
tum:  The goods that are candi-
dates to play the roles of
money should not be referred  to
as money; this prevents 
triggering any preconceived
notions that experimental sub-
jects might have regarding the
proper role of a money object.
Hence McCabe and other exper-
imenters testing theories of
money use more neutral terms
like tickets to refer to objects
that may serve as money.
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For these and other reasons, a few
researchers have begun to use laboratory
experiments, as well as survey questionnaires,
to test both the assumptions and predictions
of modern macroeconomic models. This
paper describes some of these studies,
focusing on laboratory tests of various dif-
ferent models of money.2 Though the
major emphasis is on the results obtained
from laboratory studies of monetary theo-
ries, some attention is also devoted  to
issues of experimental design. 
THE ROLES AND TYPES  
OF MONEY
Monetary theorists have no single uni-
ﬁed theory of money and do not appear
close to achieving any kind of consensus
on what a reasonable theory might entail.
Instead, there are several different and
competing models of money. Each model
can account for some, but not all, of the
important roles that money plays in the
economy. In reviewing laboratory tests of
these theories it is useful to organize the
discussion around the three major roles of
money.  Money serves as a store of value, as
a medium of exchange, and as a unit of
account. Money is a store of value because
it is believed to retain purchasing power
over time. Money is a medium of exchange
because it is readily accepted in exchange
for goods or services. Finally, money is a
unit of account in that prices of goods and
services are quoted all  in terms of units 
of money.
In the discussion that follows, we will
also make reference to two different types
of money: ﬁat money and commodity money.
Fiat money is unbacked, intrinsically worth-
less liabilities issued by the government
and declared money by the government’s
ﬁat power. Dollar bills are an example of
ﬁat money. Commodity money is an
intrinsically valued good, the value of
which serves as the value of money. Gold
coins are an example of commodity
money. Most of the experimental studies of
money have focused on ﬁat money because
that is the type of money most commonly
used in the world today.
Money as a Store of Value
For money to serve as a store of value,
economic agents must believe that money
will have value in the future. A necessary
condition for such a belief is that there be
a future.  Suppose it was known that the
world would end at a certain future date.
Would individuals continue to hold money?
According to economic theory, no rational
individual would choose to hold money
the day before the world ended, as money
would be worthless the next day. By the same
kind of logic, no one would choose to hold
money two days before the world ended, and
therefore no one would choose to hold money
three days before the world ended, and so
on. This argument, based on backward
induction, implies that if the end of the world
were known with certainty, individuals
would cease holding money. Do human
subjects behave in accordance with this
prediction? This is a good example of a
question that is difﬁcult to address outside
of a controlled laboratory setting.
Testing Backward Induction  
McCabe (1989) conducted an experi-
ment that attempted to test for backward
induction.3 In his experiment, a population
of players is divided up equally into three
types. The players then engage in a simple
trading game that lasts six rounds.  In each
round of this game, two of the three player
types are endowed with a unit of a good that
yields a cash payoff at the end of the
round, but which ceases to have any value
in the following round.  One can think of
these goods as perishable, like ﬁsh or
bananas. Furthermore, one out of every
three players also possesses a ticket that
can be used to buy one unit of any perish-
able good. Tickets are not perishable and
can be potentially used over and over
again to purchase perishable goods. Like
ﬁat money, these tickets have no intrinsic
value—they yield no cash payoff to their
holders.4 In every round of the game, a
ticket holder may use a ticket to buy one
unit of any good, but only if there is another
player willing to sell a good for a ticket.
Barter exchanges of goods for goods are notFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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allowed. All offers and exchanges are made
anonymously through a centralized clearing-
house (the experimenter). After any
exchanges occur, players are paid the cash
value of any goods they are holding at the
end of the round.  The cash value from
holding goods varies in a systematic way
over the six rounds of the game and always
differs across the three player types.
Holding goods yields a cash payoff to each
player type of either $0.50, $0.25, or $0
depending on the round number, and this
information is common knowledge. Simi-
larly, the endowment pattern of goods
varies in a systematic manner that is also
common knowledge. The cash values of
goods and the timing of the endowment of
these goods are such that, if the game con-
tinued without end, all players would
maximize their earnings by offering to buy
or sell tickets in certain rounds of the game.
That is, the use of tickets (ﬁat money) in
this game is Pareto improving. The game,
however, does not continue forever. In round 6,
which all players know is the ﬁnal round
of the game, no player will want to remain
holding a ticket because a ticket has no
future use or cash value. By backward
induction, no player should offer to trade
for a ticket in any round and therefore no
exchanges should ever be observed.
What happens in the experiment?
McCabe reports that in contrast to the the-
oretical prediction of no exchange, there is
a substantial volume of trade in tickets,
however, this trading volume does diminish
somewhat as the end of a six-round game
approaches. When the same six-round
game is repeated 10 to 20 times with the
same group of subjects, these results are
unchanged. It was only after McCabe
brought the same group of subjects back
for two additional experimental sessions,
each a week apart, that he was able to
obtain a collapse of all exchange in tickets
from the start of a six-round game. Before
McCabe obtained this result, subjects
played the six-round game 45 times!
McCabe’s experiment suggests that a
ﬁat object, a ticket, may serve as a store of
value for some period of time even when
there is a certain, known ﬁnite horizon, if
players do not have sufﬁcient experience with
the implications that a ﬁnite horizon has for
the value of their ﬁat money holdings.
Though subjects clearly failed to apply
backward induction, there are certain
features of McCabe’s experimental environ-
ment that may have served to promote the
use of tickets as a store of value. In particular,
the price of tickets in terms of goods was
known to be ﬁxed at one-for-one, so even
though there was uncertainty regarding the
acceptability of tickets, there was no uncer-
tainty regarding the exchange rate of tickets
for goods if tickets were accepted in trade.
Moreover, tickets were the only means of
transferring goods; barter exchanges of goods
for goods were not allowed.
Overlapping Generations Models 
of Money 
Historically, when ﬁat money has ceased
to serve as a store of value, the explanation
has not been that the ﬁat object was known
to have zero value at a certain future date.
Rather, the explanation is always that there
has been a rapid erosion of money’s purchasing
power caused by inﬂation, as in a very high
inﬂation, or hyperinﬂation. One theory of
hyperinﬂation suggests that such events may
be the result of self-fulﬁlling expectations. Indi-
viduals expect that future prices will be higher
and make consumption and savings decisions
in accordance with this expectation. Conse-
quently, their expectations of future inﬂation
become ratiﬁed in an actual inﬂation that is
consistent with their expectations. Laboratory
tests of this theory have been conducted using
Samuelson’s overlapping generations model
of money, which we brieﬂy summarize.
At every date t, a generation of n identical
agents that live for two periods is born; in
period t they are young and in period t + 1
they are old. Each agent consumes cy
t units
of a single, perishable consumption good
when young and co
t+1 units of this good when
old. All agents are endowed with ey units
of the consumption good when young and
eo units of this good when old, with ey > eo.
In addition, each member of the old gener-
ation has a constant m units of a durable
but intrinsically worthless ﬁat object, orFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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money,  that they acquired in their youth.
These old agents may use their ﬁat money
holdings to purchase some of the young
agents’ endowment of the consumption
good at an endogenously determined per
unit price of pt. Because old agents will not
be alive in the next period, they will trade
all of their ﬁat money holdings for m/pt
units of the consumption good held by
young agents.




t .  co
t  +1,  and that agents
have perfect foresight knowledge (rational
expectations) of future prices, the
representative young agent’s problem is to
subject to a pair of budget constraints, one
for each period of life as follows:
The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
in equilibrium,
(1)    
Equation 1 is a ﬁrst-order difference
equation for the evolution of equilibrium
price sequences. The speciﬁcation of the
model is completed by assuming (for now)
that mt is set equal to a constant m  > 0 for
all t. Given this assumption, the model has
a unique stationary solution that is given
as follows: 
An illustration of Equation 1 and the
stationary solution is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1 plots the price level at time  t + 1
against the price level at time t. We see
that unless pt is equal to the stationary
solution, 
_
p, the equilibrium path of prices
will be nonstationary. For instance, if
the equilibrium path for
prices, as illustrated in Figure 1, is explo-
sive, and in the limit, ﬁat money holdings
are worthless and no exchange occurs
between young and old agents—they
simply consume their endowments. In this
case, individuals rationally forecast that
the price level will rise by an ever-increasing
amount in every period, and their forecasts
are always correct—hence the name self-
fulﬁlling model of hyperinﬂation.
Lucas (1986) noted that the multiplicity
of nonstationary equilibrium paths for
prices predicted by this model might be
ruled out by assuming that agents  did not
possess rational expectations, but instead
formed their expectations of future prices
in an adaptive manner. In particular, if
young agents’ time t  expectation of next
period’s price level, pe
t+1, is given by some
weighted  average of past prices and
forecasts, for example, if
then one can show that the stationary
solution,  
_
p, will be the long-run price
level of the economy. Replacing the
assumption of rational expectations with
adaptive expectations affects the stability
properties of the stationary solution,
changing it from an unstable equilibrium
to a stable one.
Lucas argued that the question of
which type of equilibrium path for prices
was more likely (stationary or
nonstationary-hyperinﬂationary) could be
addressed in a controlled laboratory exper-
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Lim, Prescott, and Sunder (1994) designed
an experiment that aimed to effectively
implement the overlapping generations
environment and address the question
posed by Lucas. In every period of Lim et
al.’s experimental sessions, a group of sub-
jects of size n was chosen from an N-member
subject pool to take a two-period turn in
the model environment. Subjects entered
ﬁrst as a member of the young generation,
and in the next period they were members
of the old generation. Thus in every period
of a session there were 2n subjects partici-
pating in the model environment and N –
2n > n subjects who were idle. Each agent
in the young generation was endowed with
ey chips and each old agent was endowed
with eo chips (ey > eo).  In addition, the ini-
tial old generation of subjects (who, unlike
other participants, were only in the model
environment for one period), were each
endowed with m francs. At the end of a
two-period turn in the model environment,
each subject earned cash payments that
were proportional to the lifetime utility
objective of cy . co, where cy and co were
the amount of chips a subject acquired
when young and old, respectively. Subjects
who were idle in any period played a fore-
casting game in which they earned cash
payments according to how well they fore-
cast the market clearing price level that
would prevail in the next period, that is,
how close their expectations of next
period’s price level,  ,  were to the actual
price level  .  Because of the backward
induction problem, the experimenters did
not want to reveal to subjects when the
experimental session would end.5 When
experimenters ﬁnally did announce the
end of the session, they used the average
forecast of the future price level, as deter-
mined by the nonparticipating subjects, to
determine the value of all money holdings
in terms of chips. They thus prevented the
backward induction problem and had a
ﬁnal period price level that was
endogenously determined by the subjects
themselves.
After some experimentation, Lim et al.
settled on a mechanism for the exchange
of chips for francs between young and old
agents. Young agents were asked to
provide a schedule of the quantity of chips
they would supply at various different
prices. The chip supply schedules from all
young agents were then aggregated to form
a market supply schedule. The market
demand for chips was the amount of chips
that could be bought with the total quan-
tity of francs held by all members of the
old generation (that is, old agents
passively offered all of their francs for
chips). The price at which aggregate
supply equaled aggregate demand was
announced as the market-clearing, 
equilibrium price level. This price was
used to determine the quantity of chips
supplied by each young agent (according
to their individual supply schedules), the
lifetime utility of old agents who would
then exit the model environment, and the
winner of the price forecasting game
among those agents who were not partici-
pating as members of either the young or
old generation.
In all of Lim et al.’s experimental sessions
the price level ﬂuctuated somewhat as agents
learned how to make good decisions, but 
it was never explosive. Indeed, near the end
of the experiments, the price level was close
to, though never precisely equal to, the
unique stationary value  
_
p 6. The authors
conclude from their experimental ﬁndings
that stationary solutions for prices are good
candidates for the equilibria of overlapping
generations models and that explosive self-
fulﬁlling hyperinﬂationary equilibria
appear unlikely.
In some respects, this conclusion is
not too surprising. As previously noted,
Lucas (as well as others) argued that if
individuals did not possess rational expec-
tations of future prices and instead formed
their expectations adaptively, then the sta-
bility of stationary equilibria such as 
_
p
might well be altered. Surprisingly, Lim et
al. did not analyze or report forecasted
prices from their experiment, preferring to
concentrate their attention on the behavior
of the market price level. They did note,
however, that forecasts appeared to be
adaptive, an observation that might





5 Of course, subjects were aware
that the experimental session
would last for a ﬁnite period—
no more than a couple of
hours.  They did not know,
however, precisely when the
game they were playing would
end.
6 In fact, the price level was 
even closer to another station-
ary Nash equilibrium where
players take account of the size
of the group of buyers and sell-
ers and do not behave as if
they are atomistic in their abili-
ty to affect prices.  This equilib-
rium is close to the stationary
equilibrium p –.
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7 The derivation of this equation
makes use of the fact that
where is the young agent’s
optimal consumption decision.
The function 
8 Experimental results are replicated
when qualitatively similar results
are obtained using the same
experimental design and treat-
ment variables but with different
groups of subjects.  This notion
of replications differs from that
of Dewald, Thursby and Anderson
(1986), where replication refers
to the ability of different
researchers to duplicate the same
numerical results using the
same techniques on the same
set of non-experimental data.
9 Marcet and Sargent (1989), for
instance, showed that the low
inﬂation stationary equilibrium,
would be stable and
the high inﬂation stationary
equilibrium,  , would be
unstable if agents forecast inﬂa-
tion by running a least squares
autoregression on past prices.
10 Similarly, Arifovic (1995) argues
that the experimental ﬁndings
are similar to those generated
by a genetic algorithm—an
adaptive, stochastic search
process based on principles of
population genetics, which also
converges to a neighborhood of
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Setting aside the issue of whether indi-
viduals have rational expectations, one
may question the self-fulﬁlling theory of
hyperinﬂation that Lim et al. tested on
other grounds. In particular, this theory
ignores any causal relationship between
the growth rate of the money supply and
the rate of inﬂation of the price level.
Inﬂation occurs even though the stock of
money is constant. Historically, most
hyperinﬂations have been ended by some
effort to reduce the growth rate of the
money stock (see, for example, Sargent
[1986]), which suggests that a growing
money stock should be a prerequisite for a
hyperinﬂation to occur. 
Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994,
and 1995) have conducted a series of
experiments involving versions of the
overlapping generations model where the
stock of ﬁat money is allowed to grow over
time. In these experiments there exists a
government (the experimenter) that seeks
to purchase a constant per capita amount,
d, of the consumption good (chips) in
every period. The government purchases d
chips at price pt by expanding the money
supply (the amount of francs per capita) m
as follows:  
(2)
Using the policy rule, Equation 2, in com-
bination with Equation 1 and assuming
rational expectations, one can derive a law
of motion for gross inﬂation, deﬁned by
, of the form: 
This equation is illustrated in Figure 2.
7
In this version of the model, if d is
small enough, there exist two stationary
inﬂation rates,  .  Under the
assumption that agents possess rational
expectations, the higher of these two
stationary values is predicted to be the
limit of all equilibrium sequences for inﬂa-
tion starting from any initial value for
; Figure 2, illustrates one such
equilibrium sequence with an initial inﬂa-
tion rate of p´.  
What happens when subjects are
placed in this environment? Do they coor-
dinate their expectations in such a way as
to achieve  or some explosive
path for inﬂation? Marimon and Sunder
(1993) sought to address these questions
using an experimental design that was
similar to that of Lim et al. (1994). One
difference was that nonparticipating
subjects now forecast the future inﬂation
rate rather than the price level.
Furthermore, the government’s means of
ﬁnancing its consumption requirement by
issuing more francs in every period was
made common knowledge.
Marimon and Sunder report that in
contrast to the rational expectations
prediction, the actual path for inﬂation in
all of their experimental sessions is always
in the neighborhood around the low-inﬂation
stationary equilibrium, . In particular,
inﬂation rates were never observed around
the high-inﬂation steady state,  , nor
were they ever explosive. Figure 3 provides
a representative illustration of the actual
inﬂation path from one of Marimon and
Sunder’s experimental sessions (No. 7C).
Marimon and Sunder’s ﬁndings using the
policy rule, Equation 2, have been replicated
in an independent experimental study con-
ducted by Arifovic (1995).8
As in Lim et al’s. experiment, Marimon
and Sunder’s (1993) ﬁnding can be explained
by subjects’ use of some kind of adaptive
rather than rational expectations.9 Marimon
and Sunder explore this possibility and
conclude that though no single adaptive
rule explains behavior in all of their exper-
iments, a rule for expected inﬂation, pe, of
the type suggested by Cagan (1956), that is,
fits
the data from many sessions reasonably well.
When estimated versions of such rules
are used in place of rational expectations,
the low-inﬂation steady state,  , is
locally stable and the high inﬂation steady
state,  , is locally unstable, thereby
explaining the attractiveness of  .10
Using the same experimental design,
Marimon and Sunder (1994) conducted
further overlapping generations experiments
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different government policies might have
on subject behavior. They consider as an
alternative to Equation 2 a monetary
policy of the following form: 
(3)    
where is the government’s constant gross
inﬂation target.11 With Equation 3 in place
of the constant government expenditure
rule, (Equation 2), there is again the possi-
bility of two stationary equilibrium values
for inﬂation. The lower of these two stationary
inﬂation rates is , the government’s
targeted value,  and the higher stationary
inﬂation rate, , is one in which ﬁat
money ceases to have value and individuals
merely consume  their endowments.  As in
Equation 2, under rational expectations,
the higher stationary inﬂation rate, , is
predicted as the limiting inﬂation rate for
most initial conditions.
Marimon and Sunder (1994) report that
when the policy rule, Equation 3 is used in
place of Equation 2, and the government’s
target, ,  is common knowledge, the inﬂa-
tion  rate generated by the experimental
subjects’ decisions is again in a neighbor-
hood of the low-inﬂation stationary
equilibrium—in this case, .  They also
considered whether  preannounced  changes
in the two policy variables, d  or , have
any effect on the decisions of experimental
subjects. The rational expectations predic-
tion is that a decrease (increase)  in either d
or leads to a decrease (increase) in the
low-inﬂation stationary equilibrium value
for inﬂation (  ).  Marimon and
Sunder  report that preannounced decreases
in these policy  parameters do not have
much of an anticipatory effect on subject
behavior. Nevertheless,  the inﬂation  rate gen-
erated in the laboratory experiments  did
gradually drift downward to a neighborhood
of the new lower stationary  equilibrium, and
the timing of this change was  coincident with
the actual change in policy.
Given that the two policy rules, Equa-
tion 2 and 3, seem to lead to the same
experimental result, namely coordination
near a stationary, low-inﬂation equilibrium,
a natural question that arises is which of
these two rules is preferable from a policy
perspective.  For example, which rule
leads to lower volatility in inﬂation? This
is the kind of question that would be difﬁcult
to ask outside of a controlled laboratory
setting, as natural experiments that could
be used to address such questions are rather
difﬁcult to arrange. And even if such natural
experiments could be arranged, it would
be difﬁcult to disentangle the public’s reac-
tion from issues surrounding the government’s
commitment to its new policy.  In the labo-
ratory, however, the policy rule is under
the direct control of a non-elected ofﬁcial
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minimize, though perhaps not eliminate
credibility issues. Such control makes it a
relatively easy task to consider the perfor-
mance of different rules. The issue of whether
the policy rule described by Equation 2 or
by Equation 3 leads to lower inﬂation
volatility is addressed in another paper by
Marimon and Sunder (1995).
In this experiment, Marimon and
Sunder considered a parameterization of the
overlapping generations model where the
inﬂation target,  , under the constant
money growth rule, Equation 3, is nearly
the same as the low-inﬂation steady state
value,  , under the constant government
expenditure rule, Equation 2. They then
asked whether one of the two announced
policy rules is better at stabilizing inﬂation.
In this set of experiments,  Marimon and
Sunder (1995) simpliﬁed their experimental
design considerably so that young agents
only provided an inﬂation forecast (along
with nonparticipating agents).  This
inﬂation forecast was used by the computer
program to determine the optimal quantity
of chips that each young agent sells for
francs. Thus the game is now one in which
optimization decisions are entirely absent
and agents are simply concerned with fore-
casting the one-step-ahead inﬂation rate as
closely as possible.
Though Marimon and Sunder (1995)
claim, on the basis of their experimental
evidence, that there is relatively lower
volatility in inﬂation under the simpler
constant money supply growth rule, Equa-
tion 3, than under the less transparent
constant government expenditure rule,
Equation 2, the evidence they present does
not clearly demonstrate any signiﬁcant dif-
ference. Under both policy rules, Marimon
and Sunder report a few experimental ses-
sions in which inﬂation rates persistently
cycle around the low-inﬂation steady state,
even though cyclic behavior for inﬂation
does not constitute a rational expectations
equilibrium.12 They show that the cyclical
behavior of inﬂation in these cases is tied
to the adaptive forecast processes that agents
appear to be using.13 Moreover, they do
not ﬁnd that inﬂation forecasts differ much
under the two policy regimes. In particular,
there is no tendency for increasing coordi-
nation of inﬂation forecasts around the
announced inﬂation target value,  .
This evidence might be taken to suggest
that a policy of inﬂation targeting is not
any better at coordinating inﬂationary
expectations than constant money growth
rules. Indeed, because inﬂation-targeting
regimes are relatively new, there is little in
the way of nonexperimental, empirical evi-
dence to suggest that inﬂation-targeting
policies are any better at coordinating
inﬂationary expectations than earlier policy
regimes.  See, for example, Mishkin and
Posen (1997). Hence experimental evidence
of the sort presented by Marimon and Sunder
might be useful in these sorts of policy dis-
cussions. 
In extrapolating from experimental
results to aggregate macroeconomic activity,
however, much caution seems warranted.
First, the amount of time that subjects have
to learn about policies in the laboratory is
not really comparable to the amount of time
the general public would have available to
react to these same policies. Experimental
economists seek to lessen this problem by
having subjects play many rounds of the
same game, in an attempt to compress the
amount of time it takes them to learn.
There is no guarantee, however, that this
compression of learning is a good approxi-
mation of the learning process that occurs
outside the laboratory. Second, the policy
rules themselves are highly simpliﬁed
characterizations (some would say carica-
tures) of actual monetary regimes.  For
instance, under either policy rule, Equation
2 or 3, all government expenditures are
ﬁnanced through seigniorage, a rather
unrealistic assumption. Still, Marimon and
Sunder are only testing models that theorists
themselves have used to characterize mon-
etary policy regimes.  Following a grand
tradition in economic research, these models
(and experimental results from tests of
these models) are best viewed as abstract
versions of reality.14
In the overlapping generations experi-
ments reported thus far, explosive paths
for inﬂation have not been observed. How-







12Marimon and Sunder rule out
the possibility that agents have
coordinated on some kind of
stationary sunspot equilibrium
because they did not include a
sunspot variable (a purely
extrinsic variable) for individu-
als to condition on.  In
Marimon, Spear, and Sunder
(1993), a two-state sunspot
variable was introduced into an
experimental overlapping gen-
erations economy.  Realizations
of this variable were not found
to play a role in subjects’
expectations.  However, when
the realizations of the sunspot
variable were correlated  with
real shocks for awhile, the
sunspot variable did appear to
be a factor in subject’s expecta-
tions even after the real shocks
had ended.
13In particular, they ﬁnd evidence
of learning equilibrium as
described in Bullard (1994).
14Other overlapping generations
experiments, which test the
effectiveness of different mone-
tary policy regimes, include
Bernasconi and Kirchkamp
(1997), who test whether the
labeling of policy regimes mat-
ters and Evans, Honkaphja, and
Marimon (1998), who consid-
er whether constitutional
restraints on the amount of
government seigniorage can be
used to lower the stationary
equilibrium value of inﬂation.
Arifovic (1996) implements an
experimental overlapping gen-
erations economy with two cur-
rencies and examines the
behavior of the endogenously
determined exchanged rate.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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though infrequent, there have been historical
episodes of hyperinﬂation and currency
collapse. How might such hyperinﬂationary
paths be generated in the laboratory? Ochs
(1995) suggested that rather than adhering
to just one or two constant money growth
rates or expenditure levels, what may be
required to generate hyperinﬂationary paths
is a policy regime in which the growth rate
of the money supply accelerates for some
period. Here we have an example of histor-
ical evidence (on the likely source of
hyperinﬂationary  episodes) affecting exper-
imental design. Following up on Och’s
suggestion, Hazlett and Kernen (1997)
conducted overlapping generations experi-
ments using the Marimon and Sunder
(1995) experimental design, in which they
steadily increased the value of government
expenditures, d, over the ﬁrst 10 periods of
an experimental session and then held d
constant. This has the effect of increasing
the low stationary equilibrium value for
inﬂation, but decreasing the high stationary
equilibrium value for inﬂation, before both
stationary values level off. Subjects were
informed in advance of the number of chips
(d) that the government would buy in every
period. Though the level of d  always remained
below the maximum sustainable level, the
steady increase in d  did lead to a hyperin-
ﬂationary path for prices and a currency
collapse in two out of three sessions with
inexperienced subjects. One of these two
sessions is illustrated in Figure 4. 
We see that in this session, actual
inﬂation tracks the stationary low-inﬂation
equilibrium rather well through Period 11.
When the government ceases to increase
its chip consumption after Period 11 (so
that d  is constant), inﬂation nevertheless
continues to increase.  After Period 16, the
currency collapses, as young players’ inﬂa-
tion forecasts were so high that it was optimal
for them not to exchange any of their con-
sumption good for francs. Interestingly,
Hazlett and Kernen found that the currency
collapse outcome was possible only with
inexperienced subjects. When they brought
experienced subjects back to play the same
game, they found that the experienced
subjects always coordinated their expecta-
tions around the low-inﬂation stationary
value for inﬂation and tracked this value
rather closely, even after government
expenditures, d, had stopped increasing.
This last ﬁnding suggests that hyperinﬂa-
tionary currency collapses may be sobering
affairs, having a lasting impact on the 
way individuals evaluate government 
policies and update their expectations.
One can also interpret this ﬁnding as 
support for the notion that agents eventu-
ally learn to form rational expectations 
in the sense that they avoid making
systematic mistakes.
In all of the overlapping generations
experiments where two stationary, rational
expectations equilibria coexist, it is always
reported that either individuals coordinate
on the stationary equilibrium with the lower
inﬂation rate or there is an explosive hyper-
inﬂation  and currency collapse. Coordination
on the high-inﬂation stationary rational
expectations equilibrium never occurs.
One might ask why the stationary, high-
inﬂation equilibrium is ever focal under
any expectations scheme, as it is a Pareto
inferior outcome and is associated with
counterfactual policy prescriptions: A
reduction in government spending, d, or
the money growth rate, , leads to an p
*
Figure 4
The Path of Inflation in Hazlett
and Kernen's (1997) Experimental
Session 2B











Period 16 inflation: 20,841 percent.  Period 17: currency collapses.
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increase in the stationary value of 
or  .  Experimental evidence
suggests an alternative possibility: The
lack of attractiveness of the high inﬂation
stationary equilibrium is caused by
individuals’ use of some kind of adaptive
learning process as opposed to rational
expectations. That is, under a variety  of
adaptive expectations schemes, the low
inﬂation stationary equilibrium is locally
stable and the high-inﬂation stationary
equilibrium is locally unstable. Under this
interpretation, the classical policy prescrip-
tion  within the overlapping generations
framework—that a reduction in the money
growth rate is associated with lower inﬂa-
tion—is one that presumes that agents learn
over time in an adaptive manner.
Money as a Medium of Exchange
In McCabe’s exchange game and in the
overlapping generations experiments, the
primary role of money is as a store of
value. If, as has been shown, the money
good serves as a store of value, then it also
serves  as a medium of exchange because the
money  good is the only means of storing
wealth from one period to the next in all of
these economies.15 However, as Ostroy and
Starr (1990) have pointed out, though
goods  that serve as media of exchange must
necessarily  be stores of value, the reverse is
not  true—stores of value are not
necessarily media of exchange. For
example, old master paintings or baseball
cards might be excellent stores of value
but adopting them as commodity monies
would require that these  goods be conven-
tionally used in trade. To understand the
conditions under which a store of value
comes to serve as a medium of exchange,
what is needed is a model with multiple
competing stores of value along with some
motive for individuals to engage in trade.
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)  have proposed
such a model and have characterized the
conditions under which certain stores of
value may come to serve as media of
exchange. Before we can discuss
experimental tests of this model, it will be
useful to have a brief sketch of the search-
theoretic model of money as a medium of
exchange and the predictions that emerge
from this theory.
In Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1989)
model, a population of agents is divided
equally into three different types, labeled
as Types 1, 2, or 3. In addition, there are
three different goods, labeled as Goods 1,
2, or 3. Each player, Type i,  desires to con-
sume the good corresponding to his type,
Good i, but produces some other good,
.  Suppose that the distribution of
production goods over types is as given in
Table 1.  Notice that, by design, in the absence
of trade there is never a double coincidence
of wants  between any two players; that is,
no agent produces the good desired by the
player type who produces his consumption
good. For trade to occur, some individuals
must accept a good they do not want to
consume with the expectation that they will
be able to use this good to obtain a good
they do want to consume. We will refer to
a good used for such exchange purposes as
a medium of exchange. Agents in this model
are able to store a single unit of any good
in any period, but storage of goods is costly.
Kiyotaki and Wright suppose that the
storage costs of Goods i  = 1,2,3, denoted
by ci, are such that: 
where u  is the utility that all three types get
from consuming the good corresponding to
their type.  In every period, agents in this
model are paired randomly with one another.
The decision they face is whether to trade
the good they currently have in storage for
the good the agent with whom they are paired
has in storage.  Trades must be mutually





15 Similarly, in the experimental
economy studied by Lian and
Plott (1998), a cash-in-
advance requirement for pur-
chases ensures that money
serves as a medium of
exchange.
Each Type’s Consumption  
and Production Goods
Player Type 
1     2     3
Desire to Consume Good:  1     2     3
But Produces Good: 2     3     1
Table 1FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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agreed on and involve simple one-for-one
swaps of goods in inventory. If a player
successfully trades for his consumption
good, he immediately consumes that good
and produces a new unit of his production
good, which becomes the good he has in
storage. In this case the player earns a pos-
itive net payoff equal to u – cj, where cj is
the storage cost of his production good. If
trade is not mutually agreed on or a player
trades for a good that is not his consump-
tion good, his net payoff for the period is
–cj, where cj is the storage cost of the good
he has in storage at the end of the period.
In the theoretical model, each player’s
trading decision involves weighing the cost
of not trading and incurring the cost of the
good currently held in storage against the
expected net utility beneﬁt from trading for
the good held by the other player. If the other
player’s good is the desired consumption
good, then, by design, it is always optimal
to offer to trade for this good. The more
interesting trading situations are those in
which a player meets a good in trade that is
not his consumption good and that is dif-
ferent from the good he currently has in
storage.  In such cases, the expected bene-
ﬁts from trade involve an analysis of the
relative marketability of the good the player
currently has in storage and the good that
his trading partner has in storage. These
expected beneﬁts must be weighed against
the difference in storage costs between the
two goods. 
Kiyotaki and Wright focus on steady-state,
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. They show
that for all valid parameterizations of this
model, Type 2 and Type 3 players maximize
their utility by adhering to fundamental, or
cost-reducing, pure strategies in which they
agree to trade for goods other than their con-
sumption good only if these goods have lower
storage costs than the good they currently
have in storage. Thus Type 3 players will
never offer to trade their production Good
1 for any good other than Good 3, because
a trade of Good 1 for Good 2 would increase
their storage costs. On the other hand, Type 2
players will always offer to trade their pro-
duction Good 3 for Good 1, because this
trade lowers Type 2’s storage costs.
The optimal trading strategy of Type 1
players depends on parameter conditions.
Type 1 players play the fundamental
strategy of refusing to trade their produc-
tion Good 2 for Good 3, which is more
costly to store, provided that 
(4)
Here, pi1 denotes the fraction of agents of
Type i = 2, 3 holding Good 1; 
is the constant discount factor. The right
hand side of this inequality represents the
discounted, expected difference in utility
from having Good 3, rather than Good 2
in storage. The left hand side, 
denotes the additional storage cost of
Good 3 over Good 2. If this storage cost
difference outweighs the expected gain in
utility, then it is optimal for Type 1 players
to play fundamentally and refuse to trade
Good 2 for Good 3.
Provided the inequality in Equation 4
holds, the unique equilibrium prediction is
that all three types play fundamental strate-
gies. The pattern of exchange in this
fundamental equilibrium is depicted in
Figure 5. Type 2 players trade Good 3 to
Type 3 players in exchange for Good 1.
Type 2 players then trade Good 1 to Type 1
players in exchange for Good 2. Because
Type 2 players do not value Good 1 for
consumption purposes, but nevertheless
agree to trade for it, Good 1 may be regarded
as a commodity medium of exchange in this
environment.
If the inequality in Equation 4 is
reversed, there is a different unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in which Types
2 and 3 adhere to fundamental trading
strategies but Type 1 players choose a
speculative trading strategy, offering to
trade their production Good 2 to Type 2
players in exchange for the more costly-to-
store Good 3. Type 1 players then trade
Good 3 with Type 3 players in exchange
for Good 1, which Type 3 players produce.
(See the illustration of this speculative
equilibrium in Figure 6.)  In this specula-
tive equilibrium, there are two commodity
media of exchange, Goods 1 and 3. Further-
more, because Good 3 is more costly to
c c 3 2 - ( ),
b Î ( ) 0 1 ,
c c p p
u
3 2 31 21 3
- > - ( )
b
.store than Good 1, Good 3 is dominated in
rate of return as a medium of exchange by
Good 1. The notion that a medium of
exchange or money may be dominated in
rate of return  by other assets (in this case
by another medium of exchange) is a real-
world feature that is captured by Kiyotaki
and Wright’s model but is not so easily
obtained in other models of money. 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) provide
only a characterization of the kinds of
equilibria that are possible in their model.
An important but unanswered question 
is whether these equilibria might ever be
achieved by agents who do not begin a process
of social interaction with equilibrium
beliefs as the theory presumes, but who
must nevertheless adjust their strategies  to
their evolving historical experiences within
the given structure of the model. Several
experimental studies of the Kiyotaki-Wright
environment have been conducted by Brown
(1996) and Duffy and Ochs (1998a and 1998b)
in an effort to address this question.
Brown (1996) considered a parameter-
ization of the Kiyotaki-Wright model in which
the unique Nash equilibrium prediction
was for Type 1 players to speculate in the
high cost Good 3, but for Type 2 and 3 players
to play fundamental strategies, as illustrated
by the pattern of exchange shown in Figure 6.
Brown conducted two experiments in this
environment in which one-third of the pool
of 18 subjects were assigned the role of
Type 1, one-third the role of Type 2, and
one-third the role of Type 3.  Subjects were
informed of each type’s objectives, told which
good they currently had in storage, and
then asked to submit trading strategies for
all possible encounters with other agents.
That is, would they offer to trade the good
they currently had in storage if they met
Type i  with Good in storage?  Sub-
jects were then paired randomly and their
trading strategies were implemented.  They
were  informed of the results of these trading
encounters—for instance, whether the good
they had in storage had changed—and they
were also informed of the dollar amount
they had won or lost for the round. They
then would have the opportunity to change
their trading strategies before the next
round.  Subjects played approximately 
50 rounds, with the end to a session deter-
mined randomly.
Brown reports that nearly all subjects
offered to trade for their consumption good
when given the opportunity.  Furthermore,
99 percent of Type 2s offered to trade their
production Good 3 for the less costly-to-
store Good 1 when faced with the opportunity.
Hence, Good 1 served as a medium of
exchange in the experimental economy.
Brown also found, however, that only 31
percent of Type 1 players offered to trade
their production Good 2 for the more
costly-to-store Good 3, even though the
parameterization of the model was such
ji ¹
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Figure 5












































Gthat Type 1 players’ equilibrium best response
was always to agree to such trades.
Duffy and Ochs (1998a) also tested
the previously described version of the
Kiyotaki-Wright model in a laboratory set-
ting but sought to provide subjects with
more information than was available in the
Brown study. In particular, they provided
subjects with population-wide information
on the distribution of goods held in storage
by each player type.  They thought this
information would help subjects assess  the
relative marketability of the goods they
might meet in trade.  In the theory, such
information is common knowledge. More-
over, Duffy and Ochs allowed subjects  to
observe the type of player they were
matched with and the good that this player
type had in storage, before deciding whether
to trade the good they currently had in
storage.  Finally, these authors made some
effort to implement discounting of future
payoffs, as the theory assumes, and to con-
trol for subjects’ different attitudes toward
risk.  Subjects began a game with 100
points and gained or lost points based on
the outcome of their trading decisions
using known storage  costs and other para-
meter values.  Subjects’  probability of
winning a high cash prize was a linear
function of their end-of-game point totals. 
Duffy and Ochs considered two different
parameterizations of the model—in particular,
two different values for u, the utility value
of consumption.  One value was consistent
with the fundamental equilibrium as depicted
in Figure 5 and the other with the speculative
equilibrium as depicted in Figure 6.  For each
parameterization, they report the results of
five experimental sessions, each involving
24  to 30 subjects who participated in an
average of 100 trading rounds. Like the Brown
(1996)  study, Duffy and Ochs found that
nearly all subjects offered to trade for their
consumption good when given the oppor-
tunity. Some of their other main ﬁndings
are summarized in Figure 7, which reports
average aggregate  offer frequencies from ﬁve
sessions in which  the fundamental equilib-
rium was the unique  Nash equilibrium and
ﬁve sessions in which  the speculative equi-
librium was the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 7
Aggregate Results From  
Duffy and Ochs (1998a)


















Type 2 Offers Good 3 for Good 1
Speculative ParameterizationIn the parameterization consistent with the
speculative equilibrium, they found results
that were similar to those of Brown (1996).
An average of 93 percent of Type 2 players
offered to trade Good 3 for Good 1,
whereas an average of only 36 percent of
Type 1 players chose to speculate by
offering to trade Good 2 for Good 3. When
the parameterization of the model was
changed so that the unique Nash equilib-
rium was the fundamental equilibrium,
Duffy and Ochs found that these aggregate
offer frequencies were not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent. Nearly all Type 2 players, 97 percent,
continued to offer to trade Good 3 for Good 1,
as predicted in the fundamental equilibrium.
Thirty percent of Type 1 players, however,
speculated in Good 3, despite the fact that
such speculation did not constitute a steady
state best response. Duffy and Ochs attempted
to uncover the motivations for players’
actions (especially those of Type 1 players).
Using a simple learning model, they showed
that subjects were motivated mainly by the
payoff success of past actions and not by
the marketability concerns that the theory
emphasizes.
Duffy and Ochs (1998b) considered a
modiﬁcation to the Kiyotaki-Wright envi-
ronment in which an intrinsically worthless,
but perfectly durable, ﬁat object, Good 0,
was added to the model.  This Good 0 could
not be produced, consumed, or discarded
by any player type.  The ﬁat object was
introduced into the economy by endowing
a fraction, m, of each player type with
Good 0 and endowing the remaining frac-
tion, 1 – m, with their production good. In
one of the experimental treatments, the
storage cost of Good 0 was set at zero,
making it the least costly-to-store good;
the storage costs of the other goods were
unchanged. In this case there is an equilib-
rium in which Good 0 is always accepted
when offered in trade. There is another
equilibrium, however, in which no one
believes that Good 0 has any value.  This
belief becomes self-fulﬁlling because no
agent offers to trade for Good 0. In either
case, Good 1 continues to circulate as a
commodity medium of exchange in the
fundamental equilibrium of the model.
Thus agents in this environment face an
interesting coordination problem: Whether
to avoid the use of an intrinsically worth-
less object as a medium of exchange in
favor of a valued commodity object or to
use both as media of exchange. Duffy and
Ochs (1998b) report that in the experimental
economy there is, in fact, a substantial
volume of trade in the ﬁat object, Good 0,
which is accepted anywhere from 80 percent
to 95 percent of the time. Moreover, Good
1 remains a medium of exchange as well.  
The ﬁndings that emerge from these
experimental studies of money search
models provide somewhat mixed support
for the theory. On the one hand, goods may
serve as media of exchange if they have
relatively low storage costs compared with
other goods. Moreover, like ﬁat money,
these low-storage-cost goods need not be
intrinsically valued. These ﬁndings are
consistent with equilibria in which all
players play according to fundamental,
cost-reducing strategies. However, in para-
meterizations in which some players are
predicted to play speculative trading
strategies in equilibrium (Type 1 players in
the version of the model described here)
using relatively high-storage-cost goods as
media of exchange, the experimental
evidence appears at odds with these theo-
retical predictions. Further experiments in
search-theoretic environments might help
resolve these issues. On the other hand,
these experimental ﬁndings might serve to
motivate further theoretical explanations
for why money is held despite being domi-
nated in rate of return by other assets. 
Money as a Unit of Account
Finally, we consider the role of money
as a unit of account. There is no question
that money serves as a unit of account, that
is, as a common measure of the value of all
goods and services. Indeed, most of us do
not hesitate to think of the value of all goods
and services in terms of the number of
money units it takes to purchase them—
that is, in terms of prices. However, when
it comes to thinking about the value of
goods and services over time, taking inﬂa-
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22tion (or deﬂation) of prices into account,
casual empiricism suggests that individuals
frequently think in nominal, or current-dollar,
terms, rather than in real, or constant-dollar,
terms as is assumed in economic theories.
For example, the U.S. ﬁnancial press is
fond of reporting on changes in the benchmark
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which
is the current-dollar, weighted average
price of 30 Blue Chip stocks.  If there is
inﬂation of the price level then, over time,
the value of the DJIA will reﬂect this inﬂa-
tion as well. What stock market investors
should care about is changes in the value
of the DJIA in constant dollars, that is, in
dollars adjusted for inﬂation (as measured
by changes in a price index). But that is
not the ﬁgure that gets reported. 
Irving Fisher (1928) deﬁned money
illusion as the “failure to perceive that the
dollar, or any other unit of money, expands
or shrinks in value.” Fisher argued that
money illusion was a serious problem
because economic contracts are nearly
always speciﬁed in money units, and the
parties to such contracts must recognize
the possibility of inﬂation or deﬂation of
prices over the length of the contract to
properly judge whether the contract is
likely to result in a real gain or loss.
Because Fisher thought that money
illusion was pervasive, he argued that it
was the task of the monetary authority to
stabilize the level of prices and therefore
the purchasing power of money. He
likened this task to government efforts to
standardize weights and measures to
prevent cheating. “If,” Fisher argued, “we
are at such pains to standardize or stabilize
the yard, the pound and every other goods-
unit, having—as we do—ofﬁcial settlers of
weights and measures to prevent the cheating
of the public because of changes in those
goods-units, how much more important is
it to stabilize the unit of money, applying
as it does to every purchase and sale.” 
Fisher’s argument for price stability is
predicated on the notion that the public
suffers from money illusion, but what is
the hard evidence for this claim? Fisher
himself related conversations he had with
Germans he met while touring Germany,
as well as with various Americans, (including
his own dentist!) to buttress his
contention that money illusion was perva-
sive. Since Fisher’s (1928) book, however,
economists have largely ignored the empir-
ical question of whether individuals suffer
from money illusion, preferring to believe
that there can be no such illusion. As
Howitt (1987) notes, money illusion con-
tradicts economists’ assumptions of
rational, utility, or proﬁt-maximizing
agents, and for this reason economists
tend to dismiss the possibility of money
illusion out of hand. 
Recently, the question of the extent to
which individuals may suffer from money
illusion has been reconsidered by Shaﬁr,
Diamond, and Tversky (1997). Going
beyond the casual empiricism of Fisher
and others, these authors have sought to
document, through the use of survey ques-
tionnaires, the extent to which individuals
think in nominal rather than real terms.16
Though the use of survey questions is
prone to a number of biases and differs in
many respects from controlled laboratory
environments where individuals are paid
on the basis of the decisions that they
make, the idea of attempting to quantify
the extent of money illusion by asking the
public how they think about economic
decisions is similar to the experimental
methodology. 
Shaﬁr et al. used a variety of different
survey questions that were designed to detect
the presence or absence of money illusion in
economic decision-making. The questions
were presented to large groups of people
(typically 100 or more) at two New Jersey
shopping malls, the Newark International
Airport, and to Princeton undergraduates.
In most cases, the answers given by the various
groups were similar. The authors conclude
that the answers to these survey questions
indicate that “money illusion is a widespread
phenomenon in the United States.”
Consider for example, the following
question, which is typical of the survey
questions in the Shaﬁr et al. study:
“Two competing bookstores have in stock
an identical leather-bound edition of
16 Similarly, Bewley (1998) uses
surveys of ﬁrm behavior to exam-
ine the extent to which labor mar-
ketssuffer from a related illusion,
namely resistance to nominal
wage cuts.  Shiller (1997a)
uses survey evidence to explain
why there is resistance to
indexation of long-term con-
tracts.  In another paper, Shiller
(1997b) uses survey evidence
to demonstrate that econo-
mists’ mental models of inﬂa-
tion are substantially different
from those of non-economists.
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1998
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
23Oscar Wilde’s collected writings. Store A
bought its copies for $20 each. Tom, who
works for Store A, has just sold 100 copies
of the book to a local high school for $44
a copy. Store B bought its copies a year after
Store A. Because  of a 10% yearly inﬂation,
Store B paid $22 per copy. Joe, who works
for Store B, has just sold 100 copies of
the book to another school for $45 a
copy. Who do you think made a better
deal selling the books, Tom or Joe?”
Shaﬁr et al. report that 87 percent of a
group of 130 subjects incorrectly chose
Tom. The authors hypothesize that these
subjects focused on the fact that Tom’s
nominal proﬁt of $24 was higher than Joe’s
nominal proﬁt of $23, even though in real
terms Joe earned more than Tom. 
Some might argue that ﬁndings of this
sort are simply a result of the manner in
which the problem is framed, or presented,
to subjects.  Indeed, Shaﬁr et al. address
the possibility of framing effects at some
length.  The framing problem—that results
may differ under different frames—is one
that plagues all research, not just survey 
or experimental methods. Indeed, it is dif-
ﬁcult to imagine developing any model of
behavior that does not rest on some partic-
ular framing of a problem. 
To illustrate the potential importance of
framing effects, suppose the wording of the
preceding question was changed as follows:
“Tom and Joe both paid the same real
price for 100 copies of an identical
leather-bound edition of Oscar Wilde’s
collected writings. Tom has just sold his
100 copies  to a local high school for $44
while Joe has just sold his 100 copies to
another school for $45. Who do you
think made the better deal selling the
books, Tom or Joe?”
With this new wording, I would
hazard that most would ﬁnd the correct
answer (Joe) rather obvious. The new
wording of the problem, however, is such
that there is no possibility for money illu-
sion to occur—that is, the problem has
been assumed away, as in most economic
theorizing. As Shaﬁr et al. point out, there
are ways of providing more neutral frames,
which eschew terms such as real. Using
these more neutral frames, the authors
report that the incidence of money illusion
is only somewhat diminished.
A stronger critique of Shaﬁr et al.’s survey
results is that the decisions subjects were
asked to make were, in all cases, hypothet-
ical, and with one exception, subjects were
not paid according to the answers they
provided.17 In fact, most subjects were not
paid anything to answer the survey questions,
which might make us wonder whether
they were sufﬁciently motivated to think
hard about their responses. It thus remains
to be seen whether these same kinds of
results will continue to be obtained when
an individual’s decisions have direct and
signiﬁcant payoff consequences as they do
in actual markets.18 Indeed, one can think
of the survey ﬁndings as a kind of pilot
test for controlled laboratory experiments;
if the survey results did not reveal evidence
of money illusion, then it seems unlikely that
paying subjects according to their decisions
would lead to signiﬁcantly different results.
Casual empiricism of the type alluded to
earlier suggests that it should be possible
to ﬁnd evidence of money illusion with
paid human subjects in controlled labora-
tory settings.19
CONCLUSION
What, if anything, can we learn from
these experimental studies? Can experimental
evidence be used to conﬁrm or refute a
particular monetary model or equilibrium
prediction? Some might argue that the the-
oretical environments examined, especially
the overlapping generations and search
theoretic models of money, are too complex
for subjects to comprehend, and for this
reason, these theories cannot be tested in the
laboratory. This argument, however, begs the
question of just what type of behavior these
theories seek to describe. If a theory cannot
be tested, because of a lack of non-experi-
mental data and because laboratory tests of
it are judged to be impossible, then what one
has, essentially, is a vacuous theory.
17 The exception is an experiment
conducted by Thaler, Tversky,
Kahneman, and Schwartz
(1997) which is discussed in
Shaﬁr et al. (1997).
18 Tversky and other psychologists
have argued that in many (but
not all) cases, subjects’
responses to hypothetical sur-
vey questions do not depend
on whether the subjects are
paid according to their respons-
es.  Experimental economists,
for example, Smith and Walker
(1993), have disputed this
view, with experiments that
show that paying subjects
according to the decisions they
make does make a big differ-
ence in behavior and nearly
always reduces the variance of
observed actions.
19 See, for example, the work of
Fehr and Tyran (1998).
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24A more reasonable critique is that the
experimental environment is not complex
enough or that it leaves out many real
world features—for example, communica-
tion or observation of the decisions of
others, which, if allowed, would serve to
further promote the adoption of money as
a store of value, as a medium of exchange,
or as a unit of account in accordance with
the theoretical predictions. But this same
critique can be made of the theory  itself,
which does not allow for, or more typically
has nothing to say about, such real-world  fea-
tures and is itself only an approximation  to
some observed real-world phenomena.
The approach of experimental researchers
is to attempt to approximate the theoretical
environment as closely as possible and then
argue that the experimental  results from the
approximated environment  can be used to
test the theory. In many cases, as we have
seen, these laboratory approximations deliver
results that are consistent with some of the
theoretical predictions.  Furthermore, in
the overlapping generations and search-
theoretic environments where multiple
equilibria are possible, evidence from labo-
ratory experiments can be used to resolve the
question of which equilibrium is likely to
be more focal, and therefore more relevant,
for policy purposes or theoretical extensions.
In cases where the experimental results
are at odds with the theory, there is always
the possibility that further reﬁnements of
the experimental environment—for instance,
changes in the manner in which problems
are framed—may serve to deliver experimental
results that ultimately conﬁrm the theoret-
ical predictions. There should also, however,
be feedback from experimental results to
theoretical modeling, especially when
experimental results are continually found
at odds with a particular theory.
The experimental studies discussed in
this paper provide some support for several
different theories of money, but large gaps
still remain in our understanding of why
money is held and how decisions involving
money are made. Further theoretical work,
in combination with laboratory experiments
can serve only to deepen our understanding
of this important topic.
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